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Abstract
This research compares the performance of bottom-up, self-motivated behavioral interventions with top-down
interventions targeted at controlling an ‘‘Influenza-like-illness’’. Both types of interventions use a variant of the ring
strategy. In the first case, when the fraction of a person’s direct contacts who are diagnosed exceeds a threshold, that person
decides to seek prophylaxis, e.g. vaccine or antivirals; in the second case, we consider two intervention protocols, denoted
Block and School: when a fraction of people who are diagnosed in a Census Block (resp., School) exceeds the threshold,
prophylax the entire Block (resp., School). Results show that the bottom-up strategy outperforms the top-down strategies
under our parameter settings. Even in situations where the Block strategy reduces the overall attack rate well, it incurs a
much higher cost. These findings lend credence to the notion that if people used antivirals effectively, making them
available quickly on demand to private citizens could be a very effective way to control an outbreak.
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Introduction
We compare the performance of top-down versus bottom-up
strategies in mitigating the spread of a simulated ‘‘Influenza-like
illness’’ in Miami, Florida. A synthetic social network of Miami is
used in which every person along with his/her social contacts is
represented [1]. There are about 2.1 million people in Miami. In
this model each person has an average of approximately 50
contacts, resulting in a social contact network of approximately
100 million edges. The median number of contacts is 42. An SEIR
framework is used to represent the disease progression within the
host. A brief description of the construction of the social contact
network is given in the supporting information (Appendix S1). The
disease model, the social network estimation and the interactive
simulation engine (EpiFast) are described in detail in [2–5].
We consider how self-motivated individuals might react in the
midst of an epidemic as they witness their immediate contacts
become ill. We measure the impact of individual behavior and
compare it with the impact of similar policies designed by public
health officials and imposed top-down. There are several trade-offs
between these strategies, e.g. individualistic behavioral modifica-
tions are often based on local information derived from one’s
immediate social network whereas public intervention is based on
global information. Individuals react quickly and apply interven-
tions immediately once their personal threshold is crossed whereas
public health officials take longer to assess the situation and
identify the appropriate intervention targets, often resulting in
delay in implementing interventions.
The goal is to understand how individualistic actions, based on
personal knowledge and beliefs, and aimed at self protection, fare
in comparison to similar actions imposed by public policy makers
who depend on private citizens’ compliance.
This research compares the performance of three variants of ring
strategies, a self-motivated, self imposed, ‘‘bottom-up’’ strategy and
two ‘‘top-down’’ public health intervention strategies. A ring strategy
typically consists of targeting all susceptible individuals in a local
area around an outbreak of infectious disease. The area may be a
concrete geographic area or, more abstractly, a set of neighbors in a
contact network. The bottom-up strategy depends on each person’s
private awareness about the health state of his/her direct social
contacts while the top-down strategy is based on public information
about disease prevalence in a school or a census block group.
Previous studies have warned that ring strategies run the risk of
‘‘strategy failure’’ due to early depletion of an antiviral or vaccine
stockpile. Given that the ring strategy considers both pre-exposure
and post-exposure individuals for prophylaxis, it may not be
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standardringstrategycanresult inpremature and rapidusageofthe
existing stockpiles, leaving a population vulnerable to additional
waves of the outbreak [6]. However, if the human-to-human
transmission has a short incubation time, the ring strategy, GTAP
(geographically targeted antiviral prophylaxis) strategy or another
similar strategy may indeed be a very effective way to respond [7].
Methods
Disease Model
This study assumes that an ‘‘Influenza-like-illness’’ is being
transmitted in the city of Miami, Florida through direct person-
person contact. Note that Influenza may be transmitted via several
pathways, such as contact with contaminated objects (fomites), as
well as inhalation of aerosols containing virus particles. The
relative contribution of each is largely an open question. Our
model bases the probability of transmission on the duration of
simultaneous presence in a small area.
The epidemic is seeded in five randomly chosen individuals.
The model assumes that every day five new cases of this illness
appear in addition to those generated by transmission. This kind
of seeding of the epidemic helps control the level of variance
across runs and ensures that each run will result in an epidemic.
Realistically speaking, this assumption could represent infections
imported from other regions of the country. The progression of
disease in individuals is based on the usual SEIR model: at any
given time, each individual in the population is in one of four
health states : susceptible, exposed, infectious,o rremoved [1–3,8–10].
N Everyone (except the seeds) starts in the susceptible state.
N After contact with an infectious person, a susceptible person
enters the exposed state with probability p~1{(1{t)
d,
where d is the duration of contact and t is the probability of
transmission per unit of time.
N People remain in the exposed state for a certain number of
days drawn from a discrete distribution of incubation periods with
mean 1.9 days and standard deviation 0.49 day.
N People in the exposed state are not infectious.
N At the end of the incubation period, an exposed person
becomes infectious and remains infectious a certain number of
days drawn from a discrete distribution of infectious periods with
mean 4.1 days and standard deviation 0.89 days. During this
period, the exposed person may be symptomatic (with probability
1/3) or asymptomatic (with probability 2/3). An asymptomatic
individual is 50% less likely to transmit the disease to others.
N A fraction of the symptomatic individuals, chosen uniformly
at random, are observed to be infected. For the top-down
strategies, this fraction corresponds to the fraction of symptom-
atic people who are diagnosed and thus known to the public
health system; for the bottom-up strategy, this fraction corres-
ponds to the fraction of one’s symptomatic contacts whom one
correctly identifies to be infected, regardless of whether they
have been clinically diagnosed. For convenience, we refer to this
fraction in either case as the diagnosis rate.
N Finally the individual becomes removed (or recovered) and
remains so permanently.
Mitigation Strategies
This research compares the performance of three strategies; one
bottom-up and two top-down. The bottom-up strategy (D1) works
almost like an inverse ring strategy. Under this strategy, self-
motivated private citizens take action when the fraction of their
direct contacts who are diagnosed exceeds a threshold. The top-
down strategies are: (i) Block, take action on all people residing in a
census block group if an outbreak is observed in the block group;
Table 1. Parameter choices.
1. Strategies: Direct contacts (D1), Block, School
2. Interventions: Antiviral (AV) and Vaccination (VAX)
3. Transmissibility: Low with 20% infection attack rate or high with 40% infection attack rate without intervention
4. Diagnosis: Probability of a symptomatic case being diagnosed and reported for public health interventions is 1.0 or 0.3 (i.e. 100% or 30%)
5. Threshold value for taking actions: 0.01 or 0.05. Under D1, the fraction of an individual’s direct contacts observed to be infected; under Block (School), the
fraction of people diagnosed in the block group (resp., school).
6. Compliance rates:1 0 0 %o r5 0 %
7. Delay in implementing interventions: 1 day or 5 days delay for Block and School; B1, B5, S1 and S5 reflect 1 and 5 days delay for Block and School respectively. No
delay in D1.
8. Delay in effectiveness: antivirals are immediately effective but vaccination becomes effective only after 2 weeks
9. Duration of effectiveness: Each course of antivirals is effective for 10 days and vaccination is effective until the end of the simulation.
10. Simulation days and replicates: 200 simulation days and 25 replicates.
The parameters, their interpretation, and values used in the experiments reported here. Parameters 1 - 7 are the factors included in a full factorial design experiment.
The results are reported based on the average of 25 replicates for each cell in the design.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025149.t001
Table 2. High transmissibility 7.35610
25.
thres diag comp attack rate (%, entry in bold if ,10%)
AV VAX
D1 B-1 B-5 S-1 S-5 D1 B-1 B-5 S-1 S-5
0.01 1.0 1.0 0.3 39.3 39.1 38.4 38.0 11.7 3.8 5.2 19.3 22.4
0.5 0.3 39.4 39.1 38.8 38.5 12.7 7.0 9.3 25.2 27.5
0.3 1.0 15.7 38.4 37.6 36.2 35.5 22.9 9.9 12.3 30.6 32.9
0.5 17.2 38.5 38.0 37.4 37.0 23.8 13.7 17.0 33.4 35.0
0.05 1.0 1.0 24.4 37.8 37.0 36.0 35.8 32.7 15.0 18.1 36.3 37.4
0.5 25.8 38.1 37.6 37.3 37.4 33.7 20.9 23.9 37.5 38.2
0.3 1.0 35.9 35.7 34.2 39.9 39.9 38.7 26.3 29.2 40.0 40.0
0.5 36.5 36.5 36.0 40.0 39.9 38.9 30.2 31.9 40.0 40.0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025149.t002
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is observed in the school. The outbreak is assumed to be observed
when the current fraction of people who are diagnosed exceeds a
threshold. These are different from ring strategies like GTAP and
others [7,11] which consider a geographical ring around the
detected person and treat the local population within the ring. In
some cases of GTAP strategy, contact tracing methods were used to
treat the identified index cases and provide prophylaxis (or vaccine)
to the contacts of these index cases in predefined homogeneous
mixing groups such as schools, households, workplaces, and
neighborhood clusters. In all three strategies considered here, the
experiments are conducted with outbreaks defined by threshold
fractions of 1% and 5%. Note that in the bottom-up strategy, since
the median number of contacts is 42, a threshold of 1% implies that
more than half the compliant people will take action when they
observe a single contact to be sick, more than 99% of the compliant
people will take action when they observe 2 of their contacts to be
sick; a threshold of 5%implies that almosthalf the compliantpeople
will take action when they observe fewer than 3 contacts to be sick
and almost 99% of the compliant will take action when they observe
8 of their contacts to be sick.
Simulation Settings
Interventions to mitigate the epidemic include taking vaccines
and antivirals, which decrease the probabilities of both infection
and transmission if infected. The effectiveness of the interventions
is compared using the following measures: (i) infection attack rate
and (ii) the number of infections averted per drug course.
Vaccine and antivirals are chosen in our study because each can
be applied at the public health level as well as an individual level.
For example, during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, people could go
to clinics to get vaccinated or could obtain prophylaxis on
demand, e.g. in Australia and New Zealand. Vaccines were also
administered in an organized way, e.g. at schools.
Vaccines are often unavailable at the beginning of the epidemic,
especially for new influenza strains. It takes time to identify the
virus and prepare effective vaccines targeting the specific virus.
Hence this study assumes that vaccines are available only from day
40 in the simulations. This is an optimistic assumption. Once
available, the vaccines have a delay in becoming effective. We
assume that they become effective after 2 weeks of application but
remain effective for a long time – at least the duration of the
outbreak. The total supply of vaccines and antivirals is assumed to
be unlimited.
Antivirals become effective immediately but stay effective for
only 10 days. Antivirals reduce the probability of infection upon
exposure by 80% and the probability of transmission given
infection by 87%. In the top-down case there is also a delay
involved in applying the intervention to the entire Block or School.
We consider two values for this delay: 1 day and 5 days. Other
important parameters considered are the level of diagnosis and
compliance. We assume diagnosis rates to be either 100% or 30%
of symptomatic cases; and compliance rates to be either 100% or
50%. All results are reported based on the average of 25 replicates
(simulation runs with a fixed set of parameter values). Table 1 gives
an overview of all the parameters used in the experiment.
Results and Discussion
The results are displayed in tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. The parameters
thres, diag, and comp refer to threshold trigger value, probability of
being diagnosed and the compliance rate respectively. AV and
VAX represent antivirals and vaccines respectively. D1 is the
bottom-up strategy, B1 is the top down Block strategy applied with
1 day implementation delay and B5 is applied with a 5 day delay.
Similarly, S1 is the top down School strategy applied with 1 day
implementation delay and S5 is applied with a 5 day delay.
Tables 2 and 3 show that antivirals are very effective under the
bottom-up (D1) strategy buthave marginal effect under the two top-
down strategies. Under the bottom-up strategy, antivirals can drop
Table 3. Low transmissibility 5.35610
25.
thres diag comp attack rate (%, entry in bold if ,5%)
AV VAX
D1 B-1 B-5 S-1 S-5 D1 B-1 B-5 S-1 S-5
0.01 1.0 1.0 0.2 18.9 18.7 16.8 17.0 2.9 2.6 2.9 8.5 9.2
0.5 0.2 19.4 19.3 18.0 18.0 3.3 3.2 3.6 10.0 10.7
0.3 1.0 0.8 17.7 17.5 19.1 19.3 8.5 6.9 7.3 18.2 18.4
0.5 1.1 18.5 18.5 19.5 19.6 8.9 7.8 8.5 18.6 18.8
0.05 1.0 1.0 7.0 17.6 17.2 20.0 20.1 16.0 10.2 11.0 20.1 20.1
0.5 8.7 18.5 18.3 20.1 20.2 16.7 11.2 11.9 20.1 20.2
0.3 1.0 17.9 19.9 19.9 20.2 20.3 19.6 19.2 19.3 20.2 20.3
0.5 18.2 20.0 20.1 20.2 20.3 19.7 19.5 19.6 20.3 20.3
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025149.t003
Table 4. High transmissibility 7.35610
25.
thres diag comp number of cases averted per drug course (entry in bold if .0.5)
AV VAX
D1 B-1 B-5 S-1 S-5 D1 B-1 B-5 S-1 S-5
0.01 1.0 1.0 10.19 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.43 0.39 0.37 0.89 0.75
0.5 9.08 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.40 0.70 0.67 1.27 1.07
0.3 1.0 0.35 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.21 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.43 0.32
0.5 0.32 0.03 0.04 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.56 0.50 0.60 0.45
0.05 1.0 1.0 0.37 0.03 0.04 0.28 0.27 0.15 0.34 0.30 0.22 0.15
0.5 0.35 0.05 0.07 0.32 0.31 0.14 0.54 0.45 0.30 0.21
0.3 1.0 0.29 0.06 0.08 0.31 0.15 0.09 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.12
0.5 0.27 0.10 0.12 0.25 0.35 0.08 0.30 0.25 0.25 0.11
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025149.t004
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transmissibility, and 40% in the case of high transmissibility, to
less than 1% in both cases. In the top-down strategies the attack rate
stays close to the 20% and 40% levels under both low and high
transmissibility respectively. If the threshold trigger changes from
1% diagnosed to 5% diagnosed, i.e. if the anti-viral intervention is
implemented late, then the bottom-up strategy results in high attack
rate under both high and low transmissibility. However, it still
performs better than either top-down strategy. These results show
that the performance of the bottom-up AV strategy is robust to
delay in implementation, drop in compliance rate and increase in
the threshold value under the parameter settings considered here.
The Block and School strategies also result in high cost and high
depletion of antivirals because significantly more people have to be
given antivirals than in case of D1. Tables 4 and 5 display the
number of infections averted per drug course. The Block and School
strategies avert less than one case per drug course whereas the D1
strategy averts up to 10 cases per drug course. These experiments
support the claim that if people can be trusted with the proper use
of antivirals, their ‘‘over-the-counter’’ or ‘‘on-demand’’ availability
to private citizens can be an effective way to control the disease.
Vaccination performs better under the Block strategy than under
the School strategy, regardless of the level of transmissibility. Given
a two week delay in vaccines becoming effective, cases in one’s
immediate neighborhood become less relevant. The Block strategy
is able to form a larger ring around ‘‘hot spots’’. However,
significantly more vaccines are needed to support the Block
strategy. The D1 strategy performs better than the School but worse
than Block in terms of attack rate; however, it uses the least number
of vaccines. It also averts more cases per drug course in case of low
transmissibility. The School strategy is able to avert more cases per
vaccine than the Block strategy but results in higher attack rate.
The experimental results imply that, under the scenarios
considered here, the Block strategy would work best if a sufficient
number of vaccines were available.
Tables 2 and 3 show that the attack rates are not very different
for B1 vs. B5 and S1 vs. S5, i.e. 1 day or 5 day delay does not really
affect the performance of the top-down strategies. Given the
Table 5. Low transmissibility 5.35610
25.
thres diag comp number of cases averted per drug course (entry in bold if .0.5)
AV VAX
D1 B-1 B-5 S-1 S-5 D1 B-1 B-5 S-1 S-5
0.01 1.0 1.0 8.33 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.68 0.19 0.18 0.60 0.54
0.5 7.96 0.08 0.01 0.19 0.19 0.60 0.35 0.34 1.00 0.91
0.3 1.0 5.10 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.14 0.42 0.17 0.16 0.34 0.31
0.5 4.06 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.40 0.30 0.28 0.51 0.43
0.05 1.0 1.0 1.29 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.00 0.00
0.5 1.02 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.27 0.24 0.00 0.00
0.3 1.0 0.39 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.00
0.5 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.00
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025149.t005
   
Figure 1. Number of people exposed versus the amount of vaccine and antiviral used under each of the three strategies
considered. On the left, number exposed versus the number of vaccines used on a daily basis; on the right, the number exposed versus the courses
of antivirals used on a daily basis. Error bars at the peak of each curve show the standard deviation over 25 runs of the stochastic simulation and are
indicative of the level of error over the rest of the curve. D1 refers to the bottom-up strategy, and Block and School refer to the top-down strategies.
The parameters settings used here include high transmissibility i.e. 40% infection attack rate, diagnosis probability of 1, threshold value of 0.01, and
the compliance probability of 0.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025149.g001
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surprising to see that the differences in compliance rate, diagnosis
rate, and threshold trigger have no significant effect on the number
of cases averted per drug course, see tables 4 and 5.
We also note that drug consumption under AV and VAX
changes linearly with compliance. A higher compliance rate results
in lower attack rate, but the attack rate does not decrease linearly
with increased consumption. The attack rate decreases at a lower
rate than the increase in consumption rate. Note that if the
diagnosis rate is low and the threshold for intervention is high, no
intervention is effective in controlling the attack rate, see the last
row of tables 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Figure 1 illustrates the trade-off across the three strategies for
VAX and AV respectively. Each panel shows the epidemic curves
marked by solid lines and the number of drug courses used by
dotted lines for each strategy. Ideally one would like to see a
strategy where both the attack rate and the number of courses used
are small. In the VAX case, none of the strategies show this.
Under the School strategy, the number of doses of vaccine used is
the smallest but the attack rate is the highest. Under the Block
strategy, the attack rate is the smallest but the number of doses of
vaccine used is very high. The D1 strategy has an intermediate
attack rate and intermediate number of doses of vaccine used.
Figure 1 shows that D1 is a clear winner as it has the lowest attack
rate and the lowest number of anti-viral courses used. Similar
conclusions are reflected in the cumulative plots, Figure 2, which
shows the cumulative number of people exposed versus the
cumulative amount of vaccines and antivirals used under each of
the three strategies.
Depending upon public health policy goals and the availability
of antivirals and vaccines, each of these strategies can be
important. The experimental scenarios considered here suggest
the following: if the transmissibility is high and vaccines are
available in abundant supply, the Block strategy is likely to be the
best choice. On the other hand, if only antivirals are available and
only in limited amount, one might consider distributing them to
private citizens on-demand or over-the-counter to make them
quickly and easily available. If antivirals and vaccines are both
available only in limited quantities, identification of infectious
cases is administratively expensive, and compliance with a public
policy is an issue, it would be best to motivate individuals to self-
intervene by applying D1.
This study examines the comparative effectiveness of self-driven
behavioral interventions and publicly imposed interventions using
a parametrized experimental design. For a realistic set of
parameters, it demonstrates how individual behavioral modifica-
tions can result in controlling the attack rate in a much more cost
effective way than either of the public policies that are imposed top
down. The novelty of this research lies in the fact that the private
citizens use local information derived from the health status of
their immediate social contact network to determine the time of
intervention. The outcomes of this behavior and its comparison
with the top-down policies have never been studied before.
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